Abstract. Stochastic best response models provide sharp predictions about equilibrium selection when the noise level is arbitrarily small. The difficulty is that, when the noise is extremely small, it can take an extremely long time for a large population to reach the stochastically stable equilibrium. An important exception arises when players interact locally in small close-knit groups; in this case convergence can be rapid for small noise and an arbitrarily large population. We show that a similar result holds when the population is fully mixed and there is no local interaction. Moreover, the expected waiting times are comparable to those in local interaction models.
Stochastic stability and equilibrium selection
Evolutionary models with random perturbations provide a useful framework for explaining how populations reach equilibrium from out-of-equilibrium conditions, and why some equilibria are more likely than others in the long run. Individuals in a large population interact with one another repeatedly to play a given game, and they update their strategies based on information about what others are doing. The updating rule is usually assumed to be myopic best response with a random component resulting from errors, unobserved utility shocks, or experiments. The long-run behavior of the resulting stochastic dynamical system can be analyzed using the theory of large deviations (Freidlin and Wentzell 1984) . The key idea is to examine the limiting behavior of the process when the random component becomes vanishingly small. This typically leads to powerful selection results, that is, the limiting ergodic distribution tends to be concentrated on particular equilibria (often a unique equilibrium) that are stochastically stable (Foster and Young 1990 , Kandori, Mailath and Rob 1993 , Young 1993 .
A common criticism of this approach is that the waiting time to get close to the ergodic distribution may be exceptionally large. If the noise level is small and the system starts near an equilibrium that is not stochastically stable, it will remain close to this equilibrium for a very long period of time. Indeed, the time it takes to escape the initial ("wrong") equilibrium grows exponentially in the population size when the noise is sufficiently small (Ellison 1993 , Sandholm 2010 . Nevertheless, this leaves open an important question: must the noise actually be close to zero in order to obtain sharp selection results? This assumption is needed to characterize the stochastically stable states theoretically, but it could be that at intermediate levels of noise the selection process displays a fairly strong bias towards the stochastically stable states. If this is so the speed of convergence could be quite rapid.
A pioneering paper by Ellison (1993) shows that this is indeed the case when agents interact "locally" with small groups of neighbors. The paper deals with the specific case when agents are located at the nodes of a ring network and they are linked with agents within a specified distance. The form of interaction is a symmetric coordination game. Ellison shows that the waiting time to get close to the stochastically stable equilibrium, say all-, is bounded independently of population size, and that its absolute magnitude may be very small. The reason that this set-up leads to fast selection is local reinforcement. When the noise is sufficiently small (but not taken to zero), any small close-knit group of interconnected agents will not take long to adopt the action . Once they have done this, they will continue to play with high probability thereafter even when people outside the group are playing the alternative action . Since this occurs in parallel across the entire network (independently of population size), it does not take long in expectation until almost all of the close-knit groups, and hence a large proportion of the population, have switched to . In fact this argument is quite general and applies to a variety of "local" network structures and stochastic learning rules, as shown in Young (1998 Young ( , 2011 .
A separate line of work studies the conditions for equilibrium selection when agents (myopically) best respond to their available information. Sandholm (2001) considers the case when agents best respond to random samples of size , and shows that any -dominant equilibrium is eventually reached with high probability from almost any initial condition, for sufficiently large population size. 3 In particular, when the sample size is two and interaction is given by a symmetric coordination game with a unique risk-dominant equilibrium, say ( ), this equilibrium will be reached from any initial condition in which a positive fraction of the population plays . The intuition for this result is that for almost any population action profile, the expected change in the proportion of players is strictly positive. The key idea is to work with the deterministic approximation of the process corresponding to an infinite population; in this setting the -equilibrium is an almost global attractor. When the population is large but finite, the process is stochastic but wellapproximated by the deterministic dynamics, and convergence occurs in bounded time with high probability. (A similar deterministic approximation is used to analyze the diffusion of innovations in random networks; see Lopez-Pintado (2006) and Jackson and Yariv (2007) .) However, these papers do not attempt to characterize the expected waiting time to reach equilibrium. 3 An equilibrium ( ) is -dominant if is a best response to any sample of size that contains at least one player playing .
The contribution of this paper is to provide an in-depth analysis of expected waiting times in evolutionary models with global interaction and stochastic best response dynamics. The model assumes a large, finite population of identical agents repeatedly interacting according to a symmetric coordination game. Agents occasionally have the opportunity to revise their actions, and when they do they choose a perturbed best response to the distribution of actions in the population. We shall consider the case where agents know the actual distribution of actions and also the case where they only observe a finite random sample of actions. In the interest of analytical tractability we shall restrict attention to coordination games and logit best response dynamics (Blume 1993 (Blume , 1995 . The method of analysis applies to a much broader class of response functions, as we show in section 7. For the sake of concreteness we shall call action the innovation and action the status quo and talk about the adoption rate of the innovation starting from the status quo when everyone is playing .
We can characterize the expected waiting time until most players have adopted in terms of two easily interpretable parameters: the payoff gain of the innovation relative to the status quo, and the noise level , where is the coefficient of the logit function. The analysis proceeds in four steps. First we characterize the deterministic (mean-field) dynamics for given levels of and , assuming an infinite population. Next, we characterize the combinations of and such that the deterministic dynamics have a unique rest point. 4 We then exploit the geometry of the aggregate response function to characterize the maximum length of time it takes for the process to reach a neighborhood of the unique rest point. Finally, we apply stochastic approximation theory (Benaïm and Weibull, 2003) to show that the estimations for the deterministic system are valid for the case of large but finite populations.
The main results are the following:
i. For a given payoff gain the dynamics exhibit a phase transition with respect to the noise level: there is a critical noise level below which the waiting time is exponential in the number of agents (selection is "slow"), and above which the waiting time is bounded irrespective of the number of agents (selection is "fast"). ii. We provide an explicit estimate of the critical noise threshold, which turns out to be quite small. In particular, when selection is fast for all positive values of . This threshold corresponds to an initial error rate -the probability of choosing when everyone else is choosing -of about . iii. For plausible parameter values the absolute magnitudes of the waiting times are very small. For example, when the innovation is better than the status quo and the agents' initial error rate is , it takes less than revisions per capita in expectation to reach an adoption rate of .
These results can also be interpreted in terms of heterogeneity in individual payoffs rather than as noisy best responses. In particular, suppose that each individual has an idiosyncratic payoff from playing any given strategy, in addition to the payoff from the coordination game. Assume that these payoffs are fixed across time, and that they are drawn independently across strategies and across agents from an extreme value distribution with mean zero, parameter and variance . In a large population the dynamics will behave as if the individuals were choosing via the logit process with parameter . Consequently, the above results may be interpreted as saying that even quite low levels of variance in the payoffs can lead to fast selection.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with a review of related literature in section 2. Section 3 sets up the model, and section 4 contains the first main result, namely the existence and estimation of a critical payoff gain when agents have full information. We derive an upper bound on the number of steps to get close to equilibrium in section 5. Section 6 extends the results in the previous two sections to the partial information case. In section 7 we show that the method of analysis extends to many types of perturbed response functions in addition to the logit.
Related literature
The rate at which a coordination equilibrium becomes established in a large population (or whether it becomes established at all) has been studied from a variety of perspectives. To understand the connections with the present paper we shall divide the literature into several parts, depending on whether interaction is assumed to be global or local, and on whether the selection dynamics are deterministic (best response) or stochastic (noisy best response). In the latter case we shall also distinguish between those models in which the stochastic perturbations are taken to zero (low noise dynamics), and those in which the perturbations are maintained at a positive level (noisy dynamics).
To fix ideas, let us consider the situation where agents interact in pairs and play a fixed symmetric pure coordination game of the following form:
We can think of as the "status quo", of as the "innovation" and of as the payoff gain of the innovation relative to the status quo (this representation is in fact without loss of generality, as we show in section 3).
Local interaction refers to the situation where agents are located at the nodes of a network and they interact only with their neighbors. Global interaction refers to the situation where agents react to the distribution of actions in the entire population, or to a random sample of such actions.
Virtually all of the results about waiting times and rate of convergence can be discussed in this setting. The essential question is how long it takes to transit from the all-equilibrium to a state where most of the agents are playing .
Deterministic best response, local interaction
Morris (2000) studies deterministic best-response dynamics on an infinite network. Each node of the network is occupied by an agent, and in each period all agents myopically best respond to their neighbors' actions. (Myopic best response, either with or without perturbations, is assumed throughout this literature.) Morris studies the threshold ̅ such that, for any payoff gain ̅, there exists some finite group of initial adopters from which the innovation spreads by "contagion" to the entire population. He provides several characterizations of ̅ in terms of topological properties of the network, such as the existence of cohesive (inward looking) subgroups, the uniformity of the local interaction, and the growth rate of the number of players who can be reached in steps. A particularly interesting case occurs when all degrees in a connected network are at most , and the payoff gain is larger than . In this case, any single initial adopter will cause the innovation to spread by contagion to the entire population. Morris does not address the issue of waiting times as such, rather, he identifies conditions that are necessary and sufficient for full adoption to occur under best response dynamics. Ellison (1993) and Young (1998 Young ( , 2011 ) study adoption dynamics when agents are located at the nodes of a network. Whenever agents revise, they best respond to their neighbors' actions, with some random error. Unlike most models discussed in this section, the population is finite and the selection process is stochastic. The aim of the analysis is to characterize the ergodic distribution of the process rather than to approximate it by a deterministic dynamic, and to study whether convergence to this distribution occurs in a "reasonable" amount of time.
Noisy best response, local interaction
Ellison examines the case where agents best respond with a uniform probability of error (choosing a non-best response), while Young focuses on the situation where agents use a logit response rule. The latter implies that the probability of making an error decreases as the payoff loss from making the error increases. In both cases, the main finding is that, when the network consists of small close-knit groups that interact mainly with each other rather than outsiders, then for small but not vanishing levels of noise the process evolves quite rapidly to a state where most agents are playing independently of the size of the population, and independently of the initial state. Montanari and Saberi (2010) consider a similar situation: agents are located at the nodes of a fixed network and they update asynchronously using a logit response function. The authors characterize the expected waiting time to transit from all-to all-as a function of population size, network structure, and the size of the gain . Like Ellison and Young, Montanari and Saberi show that local clusters tend to speed up the selection process, whereas overall well-connected networks tend to be slow. For example, selection is slow on random networks for small enough , while selection on small-world networks -networks where agents are mostly connected locally but there also exist a few random "distant" linksbecomes slower as the proportion of distant links increases. These results stand in contrast with the dynamics of disease transmission, where contagion tends to be fast in wellconnected networks and slow in localized networks May 1991, see also Watts and Dodds 2007) .
The analytical framework of Montanari and Saberi differs from that of Ellison and Young in one crucial respect however: in the former the waiting time is characterized as the noise is taken to zero, whereas in the latter the noise is held fixed at a small but not arbitrarily small level. This difference has important implications for the magnitude of the expected waiting time: if the noise is extremely small, it takes an extremely long time in expectation for even one player to switch to given that all his neighbors are playing . Montanari and Saberi show that when the noise is vanishingly small, the expected waiting time to reach all-is independent of the population size for some types of networks and not for others. However, their method of analyzing this issue requires that the absolute magnitude of the waiting time is very large in either case.
Deterministic best response, global interaction and sampling
A number of authors have considered the situation where agents interact globally and choose best responses to random samples drawn from the population. Some of these models analyze the resulting stochastic process for finite populations, while others focus exclusively on the mean-field dynamics with a continuum of agents. We have already mentioned the pioneering work of Sandholm (2001) , who observes that when all samples have size , then any -dominant equilibrium becomes a global attractor except from degenerate initial conditions. In the setting of a pure coordination game, the -dominant condition is equivalent to . 5 Sandholm's results have recently been generalized by Oyama, Sandholm and Tercieux (2011) to iterated -dominant equilibria and settings where the sample size is itself random. They show that when samples of size at most are sufficiently likely, a condition they call -goodness, then the iterated -equilibrium becomes an almost global attractor.
López-Pintado (2006) studies a deterministic (mean-field) approximation of a large, finite system where agents are linked by a random network with a given degree distribution, and in each time period agents best respond to their neighbors' actions. López-Pintado proves that, for a given distribution of sample sizes, there exists a minimum threshold value of above which, for any positive initial fraction of -players (however small), the process evolves to a state in which a positive proportion of the population plays forever. Jackson and Yariv (2007) use a similar mean-field approximation technique to analyze models of innovation diffusion. They identify two types of equilibrium adoption levels: stable levels of adoption and unstable ones (tipping points). A smaller tipping point facilitates diffusion of the innovation, while a larger stable equilibrium corresponds to a higher final adoption level. Jackson and Yariv derive comparative statics results on how the network structure changes the tipping points and stable equilibria. Finally, Watts (2002) and Lelarge (2012) study deterministic best-response dynamics on large random graphs with a specified degree distribution. In particular, Lelarge analyzes large but finite random graphs and characterizes in terms of the degree distribution the threshold value ̅ such that, for any payoff gain ̅, with high probability, a single player who adopts leads the process to a state in which a positive proportion of the population is playing .
In summary, the previous literature has dealt mainly with four cases: i) Deterministic best response and local interaction (Morris) , ii) Noisy best response and local interaction (Ellison, Young) , iii) Low noise best response and both local and global interaction (Montanari and Saberi) , and iv) Deterministic best response and global interaction with sampling (Sandholm, López-Pintado, etc.) .
There remains the case of noisy dynamics with global interaction. We know from prior results in the literature that when the noise in the logit best response process is large enough, a single equilibrium can survive as the global attractor of the deterministic (mean-field) dynamic (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Blume and Durlauf, 2002; Sandholm, 2010, Example 6.2.2, Hommes and Ochea 2012) . It follows that convergence to any neighborhood of that equilibrium occurs in bounded time independently of the population size. However, this does not address the question of how long it takes to get close to the equilibrium. 6 The contribution of the present paper is to derive explicit estimations of the waiting time as a function of the model parameters. These estimations show that selection occurs very rapidly when the noise is fairly small but not arbitrarily small. Furthermore, the expected number of steps to reach the mostly-state is similar in magnitude to the number of steps to reach such a state in local interaction models -on the order of 20-50 periods for an initial error rate of about 5% -where each individual revises once per period in expectation. The conclusion is that selection is fast under global as well as local interaction for realistic (non-vanishing) noise levels.
The Model
Consider a large population of agents. Each agent chooses one of two available actions, and . Interaction is given by a symmetric coordination game with payoff matrix where and . This game has the potential function Define the normalized potential gain associated with passing from the ( ) equilibrium to the ( ) equilibrium
Without loss of generality assume that , or equivalently . This makes ( ) the risk-dominant equilibrium; note that ( ) need not be the same as the Paretodominant equilibrium. Standard results in evolutionary game theory say that the ( ) equilibrium will be selected in the long run (Blume 2003 ; see also Kandori, Mailath and Rob 1993 and Young 1993) .
A particular case of special interest occurs when the game is a pure coordination game with payoff matrix (2) We can think of as the "status quo" and of as the "innovation", and in this case is also the payoff gain of adopting the innovation relative to the status quo. The potential function in this case is proportional to the potential function in the general case, which implies that under logit learning and a suitable rescaling of the noise parameter, the two settings are equivalent. For the rest of this paper we will work with the game form in (2).
Agents revise their actions in the following manner. At times with , and only at these times, one agent is randomly (independently over time) chosen to revise his action.
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When revising, an agent gathers information about the current state of play. We consider two possible information structures. In the full information case, revising agents know the current proportion of adopters in the entire population. In the partial information case, revising agents randomly sample other agents from the population (with replacement), and learn their current actions, where is a positive integer that is independent of .
After gathering information, a revising agent calculates the fraction of agents in his sample who are playing , and chooses a noisy best response given by the logit model:
where is a measure of the noise in the revision process. For convenience we will sometimes drop the dependence of on and simply write ( ), or on both and and write ( ). Denote the associated error rate at zero adoption rate or the initial error rate; given the bijective correspondence between and , we will use the two variables interchangeably to refer to the noise level in the system.
The logit model is one of the two models predominantly used in the literature. The other is the uniform error model (Kandori, Mailath and Rob 1993 , Young 1993 , Ellison 1993 , which posits that agents make errors with a fixed probability. A characteristic feature of the logit model is that the probability of making an error is sensitive to the payoff difference between choices, making costly errors less probable; from an economic perspective, this feature is quite natural (Blume 1993 (Blume , 1995 (Blume , 2003 . Another feature of logit is that it is a smooth response, whereas in the uniform error model an agent's decision changes abruptly around the indifference point. Finally, the logit model can also be viewed as a pure best-response to a noisy payoff observation. Specifically, if the payoff shocks and are independently distributed according to the extreme-value distribution given by ( ) ( ( )), then this leads to the logit probabilities (Brock and Durlauf 2001 , Anderson, Palma and Thisse 1992 , McFadden 1976 . The revision process just described defines a stochastic process ( ) in the full information case and ( ) in the partial information case. The states of the process are the adoption rates ( ) 2 3, and by assumption the process starts in the allstate, namely ( ) .
We now turn to the issue of speed of convergence, measured in terms of the expected time until a large fraction of the population adopts action . This measure is appropriate because the probability of being in the all-state is extremely small. Formally, for any define the random hitting time
Fast selection is defined as follows.
) such that the expected waiting time until a majority of agents play under process ( ) is at most independently of , or . / for all . 8 The results in this paper continue to hold under the following stronger definition of waiting time. Given let ̃( ) be the expected first time such that at least the proportion has adopted and at all later times the probability is at least that the proportion has adopted. 
Full information
The following theorem establishes how much better than the status quo an innovation needs to be in order for it to spread quickly in the population. Specifically, fast selection can occur for any noise level as long as the payoff gain exceeds a certain threshold; moreover this threshold is equal to zero for intermediate noise levels.
Moreover, when (hence ) and
The main message of Theorem 1 is that fast selection holds in settings with global interaction. This result does not follow from previous results in models of local interaction (Ellison 1993 , Young 1998 , Montanari and Saberi 2010 . Indeed, a key component of local interaction models is that agents interact only with a small, fixed group of neighbors, whereas here each agent observes the actions of the entire population. Theorem 1 is nevertheless reminiscent of results from models of local interaction. For example, Young 1998 shows that for certain families of local interaction graphs selection is fast for any positive payoff gain . Theorem 1 shows that fast selection can occur for any positive payoff gain even when interaction is global, provided that , which is equivalent to an initial error rate larger than approximately . The key idea is that for any payoff gain there exists a critical noise level ( ) such that ( ) displays fast selection for ( ). 9 Intuitively, fast selection occurs when the deterministic approximation of the process ( ) as the population grows large has a unique equilibrium. Equilibria of the deterministic process correspond to fixed points of the response function. For small noise levels the logit response function has three fixed points; as the noise level increases the first part of the response function "lifts up" and eventually the low and middle fixed points disappear. (See Figure 2 for an illustration of this change.) Similarly, for a given noise level, the low and middle fixed points disappear for sufficiently large payoff gains. This point has been noted by various authors, notably Sandholm (2001 Sandholm ( , 2010 and Blume and Durlauf (2002) ; the contribution of Theorem 1 is to provide a sharp estimate of the critical payoff gain. Later in the paper (in section 5) we examine the ramifications of this phenomenon for the speed of convergence. 10 The -axis displays the initial error rate , and the -axis represents payoff gains . Note that the difference between the error rates given by the two curves never exceeds about .
Theorem 1 shows that when the payoff gain is above a specific threshold, the time until a high proportion of players adopt is bounded independently of the population size . Simulations reveal that for realistic parameter values the expected waiting time can be very small. Figure 3 shows a typical adoption path. It takes, on average, less than revisions per capita until of the population plays , for a population size of , with payoff gain and initial error rate . 10 The blue, dashed line in Figure 1 also represents the payoff gain threshold ( ), while the red, solid line represents the bound ( ). Figure 1 also shows that the function is continuous and that ( ) ( ) . 
More generally, Table I shows how the expected waiting time depends on the population size , the payoff gain , the initial error rate , and on the target adoption level . 11 The last column shows the limit of the waiting time as the population size tends to infinity. The main takeaway is that the absolute magnitude of the waiting times is small. We explore this effect in more detail in section 5. Table I also suggests that the expected waiting time when the population is finite is less than the waiting time as the population tends to infinity. We conjecture that this is due to the increased volatility of the process when there are finitely many agents.
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TABLE I Expected waiting times (full information)
Expected waiting time ( . 11 Note that the process ( ) is a birth-death process, and the expected waiting times to achieve a specific adoption level can be computed explicitly using standard formulas (see example 11.A.5 in Sandholm, 2010) . 12 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
Note that Ellison 1993 obtains surprisingly similar simulation results in the case of local learning -most of the waiting times he presents lie between and (see figure 1, tables III and IV in that paper). Although the results are similar, the assumptions in the two models are very different. In Ellison's model agents are located around a circle or at the nodes of a lattice and interact only with close neighbors. Also, he uses the uniform error model instead of logit learning. Finally, in his simulations the target adoption rate is , the payoff gain is , and he presents results for error rates and .
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PROOF OF THEOREM 1. The proof consists of two steps. First, we show that the results hold for a deterministic approximation of the stochastic process ( ). The second step is to show that fast selection is preserved by this approximation when is large.
We begin by defining the deterministic approximation and the concepts of equilibrium, stability and fast selection in this setting. The deterministic process is denoted ( ) and has state variable ( ). The process evolves in continuous time, and ( ) is the adoption rate at time . By assumption we take ( ) .
In the process ( ) , the probability that a revising agent chooses when the population adoption rate is is equal to ( ). Definition (3) can be rewritten as
This function depends on and , but it does not depend on . For convenience, we shall sometimes omit the dependence of on and/or in the notation. We define the deterministic dynamic by the differential equation (5) ̇ ( ) where the dot above denotes the time derivative.
14 An equilibrium of this system is a rest point, that is an adoption rate satisfying ̇ , which is equivalent to ( ) . Note that this equilibrium of the process ( ) corresponds to the Logit Quantal Response Equilibrium defined in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) . An equilibrium is stable if after any small enough perturbation the process converges back to the same equilibrium. An equilibrium is unstable if the process never converges back to the same equilibrium after any (non-trivial) perturbation. Given that is continuously differentiable, is stable if and only if ( ) is strictly below . Similarly, is unstable if and only if ( ) is strictly above . It is easy to see that there always exists a stable equilibrium. Figure 4 plots the position of the stable and unstable rest points as the initial error rate varies, for .
13 These error rates correspond to randomization probabilities of , and respectively. 14 Note that the expected change in the adoption rate in the stochastic process is given by ( ( ) ). The definitions of fast selection from the stochastic setting extend naturally to the deterministic case. Conversely, by uniform continuity the process always reaches ( ) in finite time.
The following lemma shows that the deterministic process has at most three equilibria (rest points The result now follows by inspecting the sign of ( ) for and .
We now define and then estimate the critical payoff gain. Using the convention , let
Note that is strictly increasing in . 15 Given , if ( ) does not have any equilibria in the interval 0 1, then neither does ( ). It follows that ( ) displays fast selection for all .
The estimation of the critical payoff gain ( ) consists of two steps. First we show that the critical payoff gain is equal to zero if and only if (high error rates). Secondly, we establish an upper bound for the critical payoff gain for (low error rates).
CLAIM 1. When then ( ) . When then ( ) .
To establish this claim, we study ( ), the smallest equilibrium of . The function is strictly increasing in on ( ), hence is strictly increasing in . Thus, to show that ( ) it is sufficient to show that ( ) .
Note that ( ) is symmetric in the sense that ( ) ( ) , and it is strictly convex on . / and strictly concave on . /. Obviously is an equilibrium, so the system either has a single equilibrium or three equilibria, depending on whether . / is less than or equal to 1, or strictly greater than , respectively. Using (6) we have . / so for the system has a single equilibrium, and thus ( ) .
For the system has three equilibria, and the smallest corresponds to a strict down 15 Differentiating equation (4) we obtain ( )
This quantity is positive for all , so is increasing in .
crossing. It follows that ( ) and for sufficiently small it still holds that ( ) . This implies that ( ) .
When the critical payoff gain threshold is non-trivial, namely for small payoff gains the system has two equilibria smaller than . At the critical payoff gain ( ), there is a unique equilibrium smaller than , namely the tangency point between the function and the -degree line. For given , the equilibrium and the critical payoff gain ( ) solve the equations (9) ( ) and (10) ( ) Using identity (6) and then applying (10), equation (9) becomes
Writing equation (10) explicitly and using (11) yields:
( )
The last equation uniquely identifies as a function of . Equation (11) can be rewritten as a quadratic equation:
There is a unique solution smaller than given by
This equation implies that is uniquely determined given , hence it is uniquely determined given .
We now present an informal estimation of ( ) based on taking to be very large. Claim 2 establishes an upper bound for ( ) for all . For large the equilibrium tends to zero, hence the quadratic term in (12) (12) is not negligible and the approximation breaks down. Moreover, the expression in (14) is negative when evaluated at ; recall that ( ) .
The next claim shows that if the expression in (14) is adjusted to equal zero at , it becomes a global upper bound for ( ). Note that ( ) differs from the expression in (14) only by a constant ( ) in the numerator, and that ( ) ( ) . The proof of Claim 2 is deferred to the Appendix A.
This concludes the proof that if and ( ) then ( ) exhibits fast selection.
We now show that when and ( ) the process ( ) exhibits fast selection to . We claim that the high equilibrium is increasing in both and . Indeed, identity ( ) in footnote 15 implies that is positive for all . We also have
By definition and thus ( ) as claimed.
It is thus sufficient to show that when and ( ) ( ) , the high equilibrium is above . An explicit calculation shows that
It follows that .
The final part of the proof is to show that the deterministic process is well approximated by the stochastic process for sufficiently large population size .
Let and be such that the process ( ) displays fast selection, namely there exists a unique equilibrium , and this equilibrium is strictly above . Given a small precision level , recall that ( ) is the time until the deterministic process comes closer than to the equilibrium . Similarly, ( ) is the time until the stochastic process with population size comes closer than to the equilibrium .
LEMMA 2. If the deterministic process ( ) exhibits fast selection, then ( ) also exhibits fast selection. More precisely, for any
we have
PROOF. The key result is Lemma 1 in Benaïm and Weibull 2003
, which bounds the maximal deviation of the finite process from the deterministic approximation on a bounded time interval, as the population size goes to infinity (see also Kurtz 1970) . Before stating the result, we introduce some notation. Denote by ( ) the random variable describing the adoption rate in the process ( ), where and . To extend the process to a continuous time process, define the step process ̅ and the interpolated process ̂ as ̅ ( ) ( ) and
.
LEMMA 3. (adapted from Lemma 1 in Benaïm and Weibull 2003) For any there exists a constant
( ) such that for any and sufficiently large:
The proof is relegated to the Appendix A.
For convenience, we omit the dependence of and on and . Assuming that ( ) , it is now easy to prove equality (15). Consider a small , take and denote
. This concludes the proof of theorem 1.
Theoretical Bounds on Waiting times
We now embark on a systematic analysis of the magnitude of the time it takes to get close to the high equilibrium, starting from the all-state. Figure 5 shows simulations of the waiting times until the adoption rate is within of the high equilibrium. The blue, dashed line represents the critical payoff gain ( ), such that for ( ) selection is fast. Pairs ( ) on the red line correspond to waiting times ( ) of revisions per capita, while on the orange and green lines the corresponding times are and revisions per capita, respectively. 16 The proof relies on the following simple argument. With probability we have . With the remaining probability , for we know that ( ) is lower bounded by a process satisfying the same differential equation ̇ ( ) and with a different starting point, namely ( ) . This implies that with probability at least ( ) we have . By iteration we obtain The following result provides a characterization of the expected waiting time as a function of the payoff gain. To understand Theorem 2, note that as the payoff gain approaches the threshold ( ), a "bottleneck" appears for intermediate adoption rates, which slows down the process. Figure 6 illustrates this phenomenon by highlighting the distance between the updating function and the identity function (recall that the speed of the change of the process at adoption rate is given by ( ) ). The first term on the right hand side of inequality (16) tends to infinity as tends to ( ), and the proof of Theorem 2 shows that inequality (16) holds for the following explicit value of the constant :
When the payoff gain is large, the main constraining factor is the precision level , namely how close we want the process to approach the high equilibrium. The last two terms on the right hand side of inequality (16) take care of this possibility.
Figure 6 -An informal illustration of the evolution of the process
Figure 7 plots, in log-log format, the expected time to get within of the high equilibrium as a function of , for (left panel) and (right panel). These initial error rates correspond to and respectively. The constant takes the values ( ) and ( ) . The red, solid line represents the estimated upperbound (using constant ), while the blue, dashed line shows the simulated deterministic time ( ). Note that in both panels the two lines are parallel for small values of ; this shows that the rate of convergence of the waiting time presented in Theorem 2 (inverse square root) is the "correct" rate. Finally, we give a concrete example of the estimated waiting time. As above, fix the initial error rate at and the precision level at . Then the critical payoff gain is ( ) . Our estimate for the waiting time when is , while the expected waiting time for is .
PROOF OF THEOREM 2. We shall show that Theorem 2 holds for the deterministic approximation ( ) It then follows, using Lemma 2, that Theorem 2 holds for all sufficiently large given , and . The proof involves studying the behavior of the waiting time ( ) at the extremes, namely for close to ( ) and for large. The case of intermediate is covered by an appropriate choice of the constant . Detailed proofs are relegated to the Appendix B.
The essential ideas are as follows. When approaches from above, a bottleneck forms close to the position of the low equilibrium . The process slows down as it approaches the bottleneck, and the time it takes to traverse it increases as the bottleneck width ( ) decreases. (The term ( ) will be defined formally in the proof of the next lemma.) The length of the bottleneck is controlled by the curvature of the response function at the (tangential) low equilibrium . The following lemma shows that as approaches the waiting time grows at a rate equal to the inverse square root of the width and length of the bottleneck. (For convenience, we drop the dependence of on , which is held fixed in the proof.)
LEMMA 4. For any we have
The idea of the proof of this lemma is depicted in Figure 8 . The waiting time is asymptotically the same when the response function ( ) is replaced by the function ( ), which is the upper envelope of the functions ( ) and ( ) . The bottleneck is the interval , -on which ( ) ( ). It can be shown that the time to approach the bottleneck, the time to traverse it, and the time to get away from it all grow at the same rate ( ) ( ) .
Figure 8 -The function ( ) (red) is a lower bound for ( ) (green)
Our next result gives a linear estimate for the gap g( ) for close to .
LEMMA 5.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Combining the results in lemmas 4 and 5 we conclude that the behavior of the waiting time as approaches is given by:
(18) ( )√ √ √ ( ) Note that the right hand side of (18) is exactly as defined in (17). When is large, the process slows down when it approaches the high equilibrium. The behavior in this case is controlled by the precision level , as described in the following lemma.
LEMMA 6. There exists such that for all
Theorem 2 follows by putting together these results. Note that ( ) is continuous in , and equation (18) implies that there exists a constant such that for all ( -
( ) √
Together with Lemma 6, we find that for any
( ) √ ( )
The exact result in Theorem 2 follows by applying Lemma 2.
Partial information
We now turn to the case where agents have a limited, finite capacity to gather information. Assume that each player samples other players before revising, where is independent of . As we shall see, partial information facilitates the spread of the innovation, in the sense that the critical payoff gain is lower than in the full information case. Intuitively, for low adoption rates the effect of sample variability is asymmetric: the increased probability of adoption when adopters are over-represented in the sample outweighs the decreased probability of adoption when adopters are under-represented. In particular, the coarseness of a finite sample implies that the threshold is no longer unbounded as the noise tends to zero. Indeed, for , or equivalently , the existence of a single adopter in the sample makes it a best response to adopt the innovation. This implies that the process displays fast selection for any noise level. This argument is formalized in Theorem 3 below.
Here and for the remainder of the section, we modify the previous notation by adding as a parameter. For example, the process with payoff gain , noise parameter , population size and sampling size is denoted ( ); the waiting time to adoption level is denoted ( ) and so forth.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3. The proof follows the same logic as the proof of Theorem 1. Specifically, we shall show that the result holds for the deterministic approximation of the finite process, which implies that it also holds for sufficiently large population size. We begin by characterizing the response function in the partial information case. The next step is to show that, as in the case of full information, the high equilibrium of the deterministic process is unique. We then show that the threshold for partial information is below the threshold for full information, and also that forms an upper bound on the threshold for partial information. Detailed proofs are found in Appendix C; here we shall outline the main steps in the argument.
When agents have access to partial information only, the response function denoted ( ) depends on the population adoption rate as well as on the sample size . For notational convenience, fix the dependence of and on and and write ( ) and ( ) instead of ( ) and ( ). The probability that exactly players in a randomly selected sample of size are playing is . / ( ) , for any . In this case the agent chooses action with probability . /. Hence the agent chooses action with probability
The definition of the deterministic approximation of the stochastic process ( ) is analogous to the perfect information case. The continuous-time process ( ) has state variable ( ) that evolves according to the ordinary differential equation
The stochastic process ( ) is well-approximated by the process ( ) for large population size . Indeed, the statement and proof of Lemma 2 apply without change to the partial information case.
The following two Lemmas state that the shape of the response function and the selection property established for full information continue to hold with partial information. ). Secondly, we show that is also an upper bound on ( ).
LEMMA 9. The threshold ( ) verifies ( ) ( ) and ( ) .
The intuition for these results is as follows. Identity (19) shows that is a convex combination of the function evaluated at points , for . For low adoption rates, most of the weight falls on points in the range where is convex, and thus lies above . It follows that the low and middle equilibria disappear at lower values of in the finite sampling case. For the second result, note that when it is a best response to choose when the sample contains at least one adopter, and this holds for any value of . This implies that ( ) for , hence the process ( ) exhibits fast selection.
Theorem 3 now follows directly.
Partial information also leads to fast selection in an absolute sense. Figure 9 illustrates the waiting times until the adoption rate is within of the high equilibrium for (left panel), and (right panel). The blue, dashed line represents the critical payoff gain ( ) , such that for any ( ) selection is fast. Pairs ( ) on the red line correspond to waiting times ( ) of revisions per capita, while on the orange and green lines the corresponding waiting times are and revisions per capita, respectively. For example, we see that if the sample size is , the initial error rate is , and the payoff gain is , then the waiting time is below revisions per capita. The following result provides a characterization of the expected waiting time in terms of the payoff gain, initial error rate and precision level. 
The intuition behind Theorem 4 is the same as for Theorem 2. As the payoff gain approaches the threshold ( ), a "bottleneck" appears for intermediate adoption rates, which slows down the process. This effect is captured by the first term on the right hand side of (21). When the payoff gain is large, the main constraining factor is the precision level , namely how close we want the process to be to the high equilibrium. The second term on the right hand side of (21) takes care of this aspect. Figure 10 plots, in log-log format, the expected time to get within of the high equilibrium as a function of the payoff gain difference . The initial error rates are (left panels) and (right panels), and the information parameters are (top panels) and (bottom panels). The blue, dashed line shows the simulated deterministic time ( ), while the red, solid line represents the estimated upperbound using the indicated values for the constant . These figures show that Theorem 4 captures the "correct" rate of convergence of the waiting time as tends to ( ). PROOF OF THEOREM 4. The proof of Theorem 4 is essentially identical to the proof of Theorem 2. Here we outline the main steps in the argument, and refer the reader to the proof of Theorem 2 for the details.
The first step is to show that as the payoff gain approaches the critical payoff gain ( ) from above, the waiting time scales with the inverse square root of the gap, i.e. the height of the "bottleneck." The second step is to show that for close to the gap is approximately linear in the payoff gain difference ( ) . These arguments are very similar to those in the proof of Theorem 2, hence we omit the details.
The third step consists of showing that the limit waiting time as the payoff gain tends to infinity is smaller than the second term on the right hand-side of (21). The details of this argument are presented below. This step is necessary because for large relative to the constraining factor on the waiting time is the precision level .
The first two steps deal with inequality (21) for low values of , while the third step takes care of high values of . The intermediate values of are covered by an appropriate choice of in the first term of (21).
We now find the limit of the waiting time as the payoff gain tends to infinity. Identity (4) readily implies that
Plugging this into identity (19) we find that for all , -
Denote by the solution to the ordinary differential equation
Note that convergence in (22) is uniform in , -. This implies that converges to pointwise, in the sense that for any we have ( ) ( ).
It can be checked that
The limit waiting time satisfies ( ) , which yields
This establishes an upper bound for the waiting time to get close to the high equilibrium for sufficiently large payoff gain . Together with the first two steps and an appropriate choice for the constant , inequality (21) holds for all ( )
Extensions
This paper has examined the long-run behavior of an evolutionary model of equilibrium selection when the noise is bounded away from zero. The key finding is that the stochastically stable equilibrium is established quite rapidly when the noise is small but not extremely small. The boundary between the fast and slow selection regimes is sharp. If the potential gain between the two equilibria is below a critical threshold (for a given noise level), the expected waiting time to get close to the stochastically stable equilibrium is unbounded in the population size. However, if the potential gain is above the critical threshold the expected waiting time is bounded. Furthermore there is a tradeoff between the level of noise and the critical potential gain: a higher noise level allows fast selection to occur for lower potential gains.
The waiting times can be quite short -on the order of twenty to fifty revision opportunities per player. These numbers are comparable to those obtained by Ellison (1993) in a model of local interaction, but here the mechanism that produces fast selection is quite different. In local interaction models there are typically many equilibria of the associated deterministic dynamic; convergence occurs quickly because local groups can establish the stochastically stable equilibrium independently of the rest of the population. Hence equilibration occurs in parallel across the population at a rate that is more or less independent of the population size. Under global interaction, by contrast, there are at most three equilibria of the associated deterministic dynamic. The key observation is that when the noise is large enough, two of these equilibria disappear (the low and the middle); hence the process does not get stuck at a low adoption level. The expected motion towards a neighborhood of the high equilibrium is positive and bounded away from zero, and this remains true when the population is finite and large.
A natural question is whether our results hinge on the specific features of the logit response function. It turns out that this is not the case. The same line of argument applies to a large family of noisy response functions that are qualitatively similar to the logit, i.e., that are increasing in the payoff gain and approach full adoption as the payoff gain increases. In fact similar results hold even when the pure response function involves a constant rate of error (independent of the payoff gain) and agents have partial information based on finite samples. The reason is that sampling combined with error produces a smooth response function that is qualitatively similar to the logit, and that makes it easier for the system to escape from the low equilibrium. Figure 11 illustrates this phenomenon. The blue, dashed line shows the response function for error rate , sample size , and payoff gain . This situation leads to slow selection, because the process gets stuck in the low equilibrium where the response function first crosses the 45-degree line. However, if the gain is somewhat larger ( ) we obtain the green, solid line, which first crosses the 45-degree line at the high equilibrium. Just as in the case of the logit, one can estimate the critical payoff threshold that leads to fast selection for each given level of noise. Like many other papers in the evolutionary literature we have focused on games in the interest of analytical tractability. This restriction allows us to obtain precise estimates of the critical values that separate fast from slow convergence. In principle a similar approach could be applied to larger games that have more than two equilibria. However, recent work by Hommes and Ochea (2012) shows that larger games may exhibit more complex dynamics and hence precise estimates of the waiting times may be more difficult to attain. 
Appendix A -Proofs in
Using (25) to express in terms of , and the fact that ( ) , the inequality to prove becomes: PROOF OF LEMMA 3. The deterministic adoption rate satisfies the differential equation
The function is Lipschitz continuous; denote its Lipschitz constant by .
Note that also describes the expected change in the stochastic adoption rate , so define
By the previous observation . The step extension of is defined as ( ) for all ,
The deterministic adoption rate satisfies the integral equation
The stochastic adoption rate satisfies
Hence the difference between the deterministic and the stochastic processes is
where the inequality uses that is Lipschitz with constant and that ̅ ( ) ̂ ( ) for all . Denote ( ) |∫ ( ) |. The above inequality shows that ( ) ̂ ( ) grows at most exponentially in . Specifically, Grönwall's inequality says that
To bound the first term we take sufficiently large, specifically . This implies that and hence . The remainder of the proof will be concerned with
The following lemma will be useful. To estimate ( ( ) ), define
(∑ )
By Lemma 10, is a supermartingale, that is, ( ) . One can inductively define a martingale such that almost surely , for all . We have:
( ) (Here we have used Doob's martingale inequality to pass from line 3 to line 4.) Setting and adding up the probabilities we obtain:
It is optimal to choose , in which case
Finally, noting that , we obtain the desired inequality with .
Appendix B -Proofs in Theorem 2
LEMMA 4. For any we have Figure 8 illustrates the construction of the function and points and .
We now introduce a second order approximation of ( ) around . This allows us to estimate ( ) and ( ), as well as to approximate the waiting time to get close to the bottleneck. For in a neighborhood of we have 
√ ( )
We now look at ( ) . For close to this waiting time is controlled by the shape of ( ) for close to . In particular, consider close to and close to ( ) ( ) Using (29) we obtain
Consider the process ( ) with dynamics given by ̇ ( ) and initial condition ( ) Both waiting times ( ) and ( ( )) diverge as approaches ; because ( ) and ( ) follow asymptotically identical differential equations close to ( ) as approaches it follows that the ratio of the two waiting times tends to . The process ( ) is given by ( ) Solving for in ( ) ( ) and using approximation (30) we obtain
By a similar argument we obtain
Combining inequalities (32),(33) and (34) yields
where is independent of . Multiplying both sides by √ ( ) and taking the limit and replacing ( ), we obtain Differentiating the definition of the gap in equation (28) with respect to , we obtain that
Recall that in general A simple yet somewhat involved calculation shows that ( ) ( ).
The solution is given by ( ) . The waiting time satisfying ( ) is ( ), which implies that
The statement of lemma 6 follows easily.
Appendix C -Proofs in Theorem 3
The following two lemmas are useful throughout the proof. LEMMA 11. (43), (44) and (45) for we obtain that ( ) ( ) .
We shall now show that . / by direct computation. Rearranging the terms in (42) yields
∑(( ) ) ( ) ( )
It will be useful to cast the last expression into a symmetric form. Let ( ) ( ) ( ), then the inequality to prove becomes (46) ∑(( ) ) ( ) ( ) In outline, the remainder of the proof runs as follows. We shall first establish that is increasing on the interval 0 1. Next, we shall show that as increases from to ⌊ ⌋ the coefficient (( ) ) is first positive and then negative. These two facts imply that in order to prove inequality (46), it is sufficient to prove the inequality after dropping the term. The last part of the proof will establish inequality (46) after dropping the term. CLAIM 3. is increasing on the interval 0 1.
To establish this claim, fix 0 1 and let ( ) and ( ). Then
The last expression is positive because and by Lemma 11.
Note that as increases from to ⌊ ⌋ the coefficient (( ) ) is first positive and then negative. Let be the smallest such the coefficient (( ) ) is negative. In other words, the coefficient is negative when , and non-negative otherwise.
For every such that , we have that ( 
∑ . / ( ) ( ( ) )
The second line follows from identity (50). Using inequality (49) for all such that we obtain
Re-arranging terms in the summation yields: 
